This article was originally published by Ryan McMaken at The Mises Institute. 

Donald Trump has made it clear that he likes the idea of Greenland seceding from Denmark. “For purposes of National Security and Freedom throughout the World, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

Of course, the road to a US annexation of Greenland could go at least two different ways. One way is outright unilateral annexation in which the US declares the island to be US territory. That’s essentially what the US did in places like the Philippines in the wake of the Spanish-American War.

The obvious problem with this method is that the United States likes to claim that it is the great moral nation that adheres to a “rules based order.” To simply annex Greenland without an internationally recognized referendum, voted on by Greenlanders, would look a lot like, say, the Russian occupation of South Ossetia.

On the other hand, US annexation would be a lot easier to justify if Greenland voters formally secede from the so-called “Danish Realm,” the loose-knit polity that includes Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.  If secession wins a majority vote, this would be a crucial first step in paving the way for either de jure or de facto annexation.

If Greenland does vote to secede from Denmark, it won’t be the first time that a Danish overseas territory has voted to do so. This time around, though, it is likely the US will be at the center of the pro-secession effort.

Icelandic Secession 

In 1944, Iceland voted to secede from Denmark, and the new Icelandic state declared itself a republic, fully independent from the Danish crown. This was not a major change for Iceland in terms of self-governance, however. The 1944 vote was the culmination of more than a century of gradual independence that had begun in 1845 with the revival of the Icelandic parliament, the Alþingi, as an advisory body in Reykjavik in 1845. Iceland received its first constitution from the Danish King in 1874, and this was followed by home rule in 1904. In 1918, Iceland declared full internal sovereignty leaving Iceland united to Denmark through only a personal union under the Danish monarch as head of state. In 1943, however, the treaty tying Iceland and Denmark together expired. Denmark was locked in a violent struggle with Nazi Germany, and Iceland once again voted to distance itself from the Danish metropole.

In May 1944, Icelandic voters faced two questions on the ballot:

1. Do you support breaking the union with Denmark?
2. Are you in favor of adopting a new republican constitution?

The turnout was 98.6%. 97.35% of voters were in favor of breaking the union with Denmark, and 95.04% were in favor of a new, republican constitution.

Soon thereafter, the Icelandic state declared itself to be an independent republic. Can Greenland do the same thing as Iceland?

How Greenland Can Secede

Compared to the process that led to Icelandic independence, the situation is a bit more difficult for Greenland. Although Nazi occupation in Denmark made it even easier for Iceland to secede in 1944, Iceland was nonetheless legally entitled to secede according to Iceland’s treaty with Denmark. As historian Robert Young notes, ”Iceland invoked a clause in the Act of Union that allowed for unilateral termination of the Act, and the decision was confirmed, as required, by a national plebiscite.”

In other words, Icelandic secession was unusually easy and legal, as far as secessions go. In the long history of secession movements, however, few are “legal” in any formal sense. In practice, secession movements commonly use political pressure and alliances to gain independence even when no legal provisions exist allowing it. The success of a secession movement depends on the political realities of the present, and not on political conventions of times long past. 

That is, Greenland’s independence does not hinge on whether or not there is an established legal method for Greenland to unilaterally secede. What matters is whether or not Greenland can find the necessary political support—both domestic and international—to make it happen. For example, if Greenland were to vote for independence, and if Washington were sufficiently motivated to want Greenland’s independence, the US would intervene and apply pressure to the Danish state. The US would claim that Greenlanders must be allowed self-determination as a matter of human rights.

These will just be the stated reasons for the US support of the secession, of course. That will just be the cover story. The real reason for supporting the secession will be because the regime believes Greenland’s independence will somehow make the US state more powerful. This should be obvious since the US never supports self-determination for its own citizens, and absolutely refuses to entertain the idea of secession for any portion of the US.

When Washington Discovers It Likes Secession

Domestically, the problem with US support for Greenlandic secession is that Washington may have to manufacture some reason explaining why Greenland’s secession is acceptable, but secession is not allowed for any group of Americans.

In this case, the usual claims wouldn’t work especially well. Historically, the US has supported secession for foreigners—but denied it to Americans—by claiming secession is only allowed as a means of spreading democracy via decolonization. The idea here is that a country like Nigeria (for example) ought to be independent of the British Empire because that country, when it was part of the Empire, did not receive representation in the British parliament.

Yet, this reasoning cannot be applied to Greenland which is already a democracy according to the commonly-used criteria. For example, Greenland enjoys home rule, has its own parliament, and even has representation in the Danish parliament.  Indeed, with two members in parliament, Greenland’s population is represented on a par with ordinary Danish voters, when adjusted for population size. There are approximately 33,000 Danes per member of parliament on the Danish “mainland.” With a population of fewer than 57,000 citizens, Greenland is actually slightly overrepresented in Copenhagen with two members. Proportionally, Greenlanders receive far more legal representation in the Danish parliament than do residents of Montana or Wyoming in the US House of Representatives. Moreover, if Greenland were to become a non-state territory of the US, it would receive no votes in the US Congress at all. 

Thus, the US can’t claim that Greenland is a special case because it is presently denied a democratic political system. On the other hand, the US could claim that Greenland ought to get its independence because many of its residents are members of an indigenous ethnic group. That, however, would raise the sticky issue of allowing indigenous populations in the US to vote on independence. That’s not a conversation Washington wants to have.

Fortunately for Washington, however, it can probably get away with just remaining very vague on the issue while piling on the usual propaganda about American exceptionalism. We’ll be told Greenland’s secession is good simply because Denmark isn’t America. That will likely be enough to silence Trump’s core supporters who blindly support—or at least tolerate—everything the regime does so long as Trump is president. For those who demand more of an explanation, Washington can retreat to the old tried and true method: enflame fears about foreign bogeymen. Trump’s Greenland annexation is already being pushed largely as a preemptive strike against the Chinese “threat.” The solution, we are told, is to make the US regime larger, more powerful, and more of a global hegemon. Thus, we will be told that to allow any Americans to secede from America would be to weaken the American state—and we can’t have that.